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Comment on “Complete insecurity of quantum protocols for classical two-party
computation”
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
In a recent paper (Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 160501 (2012). arXiv:1201.0849), it is claimed that
any quantum protocol for classical two-sided computation between Alice and Bob can be proven
completely insecure for Alice if it is secure against Bob. Here we show that the proof is not sufficiently
general, because the security definition it based on is only a sufficient condition but not a necessary
condition.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Let us first look at the security definition in [1]. As
stated in the paragraph below its FIG. 1, let ε ≥ 0 and
write ρ ≃ε σ (i.e., ρ is ε-close to σ) if the purified dis-
tance
√
1− (tr√√ρσ√ρ)2 between the density matrices
ρ and σ is not greater than ε. Then a two-party quantum
protocol corresponding to a completely positive trace-
preserving (CPTP) map pi is defined as ε-secure against
dishonest Bob if for any real adversary B′ there exists
an ideal adversary Bˆ′ such that [idR ⊗ piA,B′ ](ρUV R) ≃ε
[idR ⊗ FAˆ,Bˆ′ ](ρUV R). Here A denotes the real honest
Alice, B′ the dishonest Bob, and Aˆ, Bˆ′ the ideal ver-
sions. Both parties obtain an input (Alice’s u in register
U and Bob’s v in register V ) drawn from the distribution
p(u, v). [idR ⊗ piA,B′ ](ρUV R) is the output state of the
protocol augmented by the reference R, where ρUV R is a
purification of
∑
u,v p(u, v) |u〉 〈u|U |v〉 〈v|V . And F is an
ideal functionality which measures the inputs and out-
puts orthogonal states that correspond to the function
values of the classical two-sided computation. Please see
[1] for more detailed explanations of the notations.
In simple words, as can be seen from Sec. 1.6 of [2]
(i.e., Ref. [12] of [1]), the meaning of this definition can
be understood as follows. Let α and β be the physical
systems accessible to Alice and Bob, respectively. Denote
the density matrices of α, β as ρα, ρβ when Bob plays
honestly, or as ρ′α, ρ
′
β when he applies a certain cheating
strategy. If there is ρ′α ≃ε ρα, the cheating strategy will
be nearly undetectable to Alice so that Bob can pass the
security checks in the protocol successfully, while if there
is ρ′β ≃ε ρβ , a dishonest Bob can hardly gain any extra
information other than what is accessible to an honest
Bob. Then the above security definition means that a
protocol is secure against Bob if for any cheating strategy,
there is always ρ′β ≃ε ρβ . For simplicity, we call such a
cheating strategy as a type I strategy.
Obviously, if any cheating strategy currently known or
potentially exists in the world belongs to type I, then
the corresponding protocol is surely secure. Thus it is
a sufficient condition for guaranteeing the security of a
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protocol. But it is important to question whether the
reversed statement is also true. That is, if a protocol
is secure, does it necessarily guarantee that all cheating
strategies have to be type I strategies? In fact, if there
is a cheating strategy which does not satisfy ρ′α ≃ε ρα,
then it will be detectable to Alice, so that the proto-
col can remain secure against Bob no matter ρ′β ≃ε ρβ
is satisfied or not. We call strategies satisfying neither
ρ′α ≃ε ρα nor ρ′β ≃ε ρβ as type II strategies. Actually,
they are no strangers to quantum cryptography. In many
existing protocols, there are security checks in which the
parties agree to continue with the protocols only when
some conditions are met. Otherwise they can choose to
abort in the middle of the process, and the protocols out-
put “fail” instead of the output obtained by honest play-
ers. This implies that the protocols are designed against
type II strategies. Thus it is clear that the existence of
type II strategies does not necessarily hurt the security
of protocols. If a protocol is secure, then both types
I and II strategies are possible. That is, “all cheating
strategies belong to type I” is not the necessary condi-
tion for a protocol to be secure. Therefore, while the
security definition in [1] is a true statement, it cannot be
used as “a two-party quantum protocol is ε-secure against
Bob if and only if for any real adversary B′ there exists
an ideal adversary Bˆ′ such that [idR ⊗ piA,B′ ](ρUV R) ≃ε
[idR ⊗FAˆ,Bˆ′ ](ρUV R)”, since the reversed statement “for
any real adversary B′, there exists an ideal adversary Bˆ′
such that [idR⊗piA,B′ ](ρUV R) ≃ε [idR⊗FAˆ,Bˆ′ ](ρUV R) if
the protocol is ε-secure against Bob” is not true. There
can be type II strategies which are not ε-close to any
ideal adversary.
Now back to the no-go proof for two-sided computation
in [1]. In brief, the key starting points of the proof are
as follows. Suppose that there is a quantum protocol for
classical two-sided computation which is already assumed
to be secure against a dishonest Bob. To prove that it
must be insecure against Alice, in the paragraph before
Eq. (1) of [1], the following cheating strategy of Bob is
considered. He plays the honest but purified strategy and
outputs the purification of the protocol (register Y ′
1
) and
the output values f(u, v) (register Y ). We call it strategy
B′
0
hereafter. Since the protocol is ε-secure against Bob,
in the opinion of [1] there exists a secure state σRXV˜ Y ′
2satisfying σRXY ′ ≃ε ρRXY ′ , where Y ′ = Y ′1Y . Applying
Uhlmann’s theorem on σRXY ′ ≃ε ρRXY ′ , Eq. (1) of [1]
can be obtained, which further leads to the rest part of
the no-go proof.
However, according to our above discussion on the se-
curity definition, “the protocol is ε-secure against Bob”
does not necessarily guarantees that “all cheating strate-
gies (including strategy B′
0
) must be type I strategies”,
because the latter statement is not the necessary condi-
tion of the former. If B′
0
belongs to type II, then the
protocol can still be secure against Bob, while the equa-
tion σRXY ′ ≃ε ρRXY ′ no longer holds. Consequently, Eq.
(1) does not necessarily remain valid so that the no-go
proof will lose its base. Thus we can see that the proof in
[1] may apply to a protocol for which B′0 can be proven
to be a type I strategy (given that all other features of
the protocols studied in [1] are also met). But it is not
sufficient general to cover all protocols, since there is no
evidence (at least not provided in [1]) showing that B′
0
always has to be a type I strategy for any protocol poten-
tially exists. By designing proper security checks which
can make B′0 appear as a type II strategy, it is possible
to build protocols not covered by the proof in [1]. There-
fore, the door for finding secure quantum protocols for
classical two-party computation is not closed completely.
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